In their first-ever live Q&A, Damien and Jeremy open with a full "around the grounds" market update covering house and unit data, including the three-month change since the Federal Budget, before taking live questions from listeners.
Capital Cities: House Markets
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Darwin remains well out in front on DSR3 (80), also the cheapest capital for houses and the best yield (over 5%). Perth has eased two points from last month, potentially an early sign of cooling, but remains clearly hotter than every capital besides Darwin, with 12-month growth still just under 19%, though down from over 21% the previous month. Sydney showed the strongest improvement in demand, its DSR3 jumping from 62 to 65, the largest gain of any capital, even though its 12-month growth has slowed to just 0.2%, practically flat.
Growth momentum has softened broadly: Melbourne moved from positive 0.8% to negative 3.2%, Brisbane eased from 11% to 8%, Adelaide from around 11–12% to 9.3%, and even Darwin's pace slowed slightly (14.5% to 13.1%), though still comfortably in boom territory. Damien notes that based on a conversation with a Brisbane buyers agent, it appears to be the middle of the market taking the hardest hit in that city specifically, rather than the very top end as might be assumed.
Houses: Three-Month Change Since the Budget
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Darwin recorded the largest three-month movement (around 38%, based on typical value rather than median, so Jeremy flags some caution around this figure), followed by Perth (2.5%) and Hobart (2%), while every other capital was negative, Brisbane the weakest. Melbourne and Canberra both fell around 4.5%, with Sydney down more modestly. Overall, state capital houses were down 1.2% over the three months. Damien notes Melbourne's higher price points appear to have been hit harder than its more affordable pockets.
Houses: Stock on Market and Days on Market
Stock on market fell in Hobart (down 13.8%) and Canberra (down 3%), was roughly flat in Sydney and Melbourne, and rose substantially in Perth (29%) and Brisbane (27%). Darwin's 26% increase looks dramatic in percentage terms but reflects just 62 additional houses, a reminder of how small that market is in absolute terms. Jeremy explains the general pattern points to properties for sale not being absorbed quickly enough given some buyer hesitation, and flags Hobart's drop as notable, though reiterates that a single metric like stock on market should always be read alongside the fuller DSR picture, which still shows Hobart as a broadly balanced market at 59.
Days on market rose across every capital over the three months, Hobart held up best but still rose around 13%, while Canberra, Brisbane, and Sydney slowed the most, and even stronger markets like Perth (up 24%) and Darwin (up nearly 17%) saw selling times increase. Nationally, average time to sell moved from around five weeks to six to seven weeks.
Capital Cities: Unit Markets
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Darwin remains the clear unit leader, DSR3 holding steady at 79, market cycle timing improving from 50 to 52, and typical value rising to $470,000, though annual growth eased from 19.2% to 16.7%. Sydney and Melbourne both improved slightly on demand (DSR3 up from 58 to 59 and 52 to 53 respectively), even as annual growth slowed in both cities. Perth and Brisbane softened on both measures, Perth's DSR3 easing from 65 to 64 with growth slowing to 23%, and Brisbane's DSR3 from 57 to 55 with growth easing to 19%. Overall, demand for units is holding up reasonably well even as growth cools, particularly in markets that have already run hardest.
Units: Three-Month Change
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Units have held up notably better than houses over the same three-month period, up 1.4% on average across the eight capitals. Darwin again stands out, up 9.6%, which on a $400,000–$470,000 unit works out to around $40,000 in just three months, in a market broadly moving downward elsewhere. Jeremy suggests this may reflect buyers priced out of other capitals turning to cheaper alternatives. Damien notes similar affordability-driven opportunity in Sydney's western suburbs and Melbourne's more accessible price points, but that Darwin's combination of a $470,000 typical value and strong yield is hard to beat, an investor at around 80% LVR is close to cash flow positive from the outset.
Stock on market for units declined modestly in Sydney, Melbourne, and Hobart, but rose sharply in Adelaide, Brisbane, and Perth (all around 30%), meaning roughly one in three of those markets' unit listings have sat unsold for the full three months. Days on market for units rose consistently across the board too, up around 29% on average, a pattern both hosts describe as the most broad-based, consistent shift they've seen in the data over this period.
Live Q&A
The following section covers live listener questions submitted during the broadcast.
Is there any property metric that's dramatically changed since the May Federal Budget?
Jeremy points to days on market as the standout: up around 29% for units and 27% for houses over the three months, a change he considers genuinely staggering, even though he hasn't checked every single metric to confirm it's the single largest mover. He notes stock on market also rose meaningfully (around 11% for both houses and units), but unlike days on market, which moved consistently in one direction across every capital, stock on market showed a genuine mix of increases and decreases city to city.
Which specific towns (in Tasmania) are worth investing in?
Looking at Devonport and Burnie (Tasmania) at the significant urban area level, Devonport shows a DSR3 of 69 (against an average of 61 for all SUAs nationally), a good gross yield, very tight vacancy, strong data reliability (71), rental growth of 27% over the past year, low days on market, tight stock on market, though a market cycle timing score of 22, below the national SUA average of around 30, reflecting its already-strong five-year growth run of around 44%. Burnie (Somerset) shows a DSR3 of 69 as well, with similar characteristics; both hosts note the roughly $550,000 typical value is a comparatively strong DSR for that particular price bracket, even though options at that exact price point are increasingly limited nationally.
Jeremy points out Burnie's three-year DSR3 change has been minimal (a 1% decline) despite delivering 31% growth over that period, a genuinely balanced market that's still performed well, and notes the historical chart shows some real volatility (DSR3 swinging between the 40s and 60s over recent years), typical of a smaller significant urban area with a more thinly traded market.
Which segment of the market is falling the most (Sydney under $1.5m, $2m, $3m), and what should be expected with potential further rate rises?
Jeremy hasn't specifically broken this down by price segment but references a same-day report from Cotality comparing upper, middle, and lower quartile performance, noting only one capital (Canberra) showed the upper quartile outperforming the lower quartile, suggesting pricier suburbs are being hit harder than the middle or lower end, likely an affordability-driven effect. Both flag this as a strong candidate for a dedicated future episode, potentially breaking the market into deciles or quintiles for a more detailed view.
On rate rises specifically, Jeremy is upfront this is hard to predict, but shares recent analysis on how long negative national growth periods have historically lasted: an average of around 10 months, with the longest around 16 months. He notes global shocks (like the GFC) have historically had less impact on Australian property than self-inflicted domestic events (APRA lending restrictions, the 2018 federal election), and suggests the current slowdown falls into that self-inflicted category, meaning it could persist longer if paired with further rate rises driven by stubborn inflation, or could simply extend the overall timeframe without a sharper decline.
How much growth potential does Darwin (houses) have left, and what risks exist beyond the three-year DSR3 forecast?
Jeremy is direct: "loads," describing Darwin's run as barely started. He addresses the common claim that Darwin is "investor-led" directly: vacancy is the most sensitive indicator of investor-driven activity, since a wave of investor purchases converting owner-occupied homes into rentals would be expected to push vacancy up sharply, not down. Instead, Darwin's vacancy rate has continued falling (down to 0.3% at the time of recording), the opposite of what would be expected in a genuinely investor-dominated market. He also notes that over the full period commonly cited as Darwin being "investor-led," vacancy has actually decreased, further undermining the claim.
On risk beyond the three-year forecast window, Jeremy explains investors have two broad options once that horizon passes: hold long-term (acknowledging Darwin's history includes prolonged periods of underperformance, a genuine risk in smaller capital cities generally) or use built-up equity to buy elsewhere, or sell, with the right choice depending on ownership structure and personal tax circumstances, best discussed with an accountant. He doesn't see this as a significant long-term risk, and would be comfortable holding in Darwin for decades if needed.
Looking at a longer historical view (January 2010 to August 2026), Darwin has grown just 68%, while Sydney grew 191%, Adelaide 172%, and Brisbane 168% over the same period, illustrating just how far behind Darwin remains on a longer-term view, and reinforcing Jeremy's confidence that, statistically, it still has considerable room to close that gap. Asked which three markets they'd pick for the best growth over the next decade based purely on the data, both hosts independently land on the same three lowest-growth-to-date capitals (effectively Darwin, Canberra, and Melbourne), citing early signs of DSR improvement in Canberra and patience being required for pockets of Melbourne given its size and current yield challenges. Jeremy adds that Melbourne held the Economist Intelligence Unit's top global liveability ranking for six consecutive years in the past, and while it isn't ranked as highly today, nothing fundamental about the city's appeal has changed, suggesting buyer interest is likely to return over time.
With another RBA rate rise still possible and borrowing capacity already tight, what should someone planning to buy in the next six months do differently?
Jeremy notes cash flow is a genuinely different consideration now that negative gearing benefits no longer apply the same way to newly purchased established property, which may affect lending serviceability, since some lenders (particularly at lower LVRs, below 70%) do factor in more of the rental income to help offset this. Damien doesn't see anything wrong with waiting, noting more stock coming onto the market simply means more choice, and that there's no urgency to buy right now unless personal circumstances (income, expenses) are set to change. He also raises the alternative of investors choosing to spend on lifestyle instead for now (holidays, a car), while stressing the importance of maintaining a buffer and only buying at a price point that's genuinely comfortable given the long-term nature of the investment.
Jeremy's guidance: if cash flow is genuinely tight, targeting a higher-yielding property makes sense under the new conditions; if serviceability isn't a constraint, it's business as usual, continue targeting high-DSR markets regardless. For more cautious investors, he doesn't believe the current softening resembles a share-market-style "dead cat bounce," and estimates there's no urgency, perhaps two to three months of reasonable "procrastination" available before it's worth acting.
If a significant urban area shows fearful sentiment but a specific suburb within it shows greedy demand-supply metrics, which one takes priority?
Jeremy explains his approach: for an isolated, one-off suburb, he'd first check the DSR historical chart for volatility, since a single strong month could reflect a temporary marketing push by local agents rather than a genuine trend, and would want to see consistency or a rising trend before trusting it. If the surrounding city or SUA is broadly weak and no neighbouring suburbs show similarly strong figures, he'd be cautious. But if a genuine cluster exists (a local government area or postcode spanning half a dozen or so similarly strong suburbs), he'd have enough confidence to proceed regardless of how the broader significant urban area is performing, citing Melbourne as a current real-world example of exactly this pattern, a lacklustre city overall, with specific pockets still offering excellent, immediate capital growth potential.
If relying on short-term, three-year DSR3-style forecasts and active trading to build wealth, do long-term fundamentals like land-to-asset ratio and buying established still matter?
Jeremy explains that whether to sell and reallocate always comes down to weighing opportunity cost (what's foregone by continuing to hold) against equity recycling cost (capital gains tax, agent commission, stamp duty on a new purchase, research, and buyers agent fees on the way back in), a calculation that becomes more complex depending on ownership structure, particularly for property held in a self-managed super fund, where new borrowing is no longer possible, meaning a sale needs to release enough equity to buy the next property outright in cash within the fund.
On land-to-asset ratio specifically, Jeremy confirms it remains a genuine, real long-term factor, but is less pronounced over a shorter holding period than commonly assumed, since land-to-asset ratio isn't a fixed number, it naturally shifts over time as a building ages and eventually requires capital injection for renovation or rebuilding, which resets the ratio. Even over a shorter three-year hold, though, he'd still generally prefer a modestly worn but not run-down established property over something freshly renovated, purely for the added scope to manufacture value.
Damien illustrates the long-term "evening out" effect using Perth versus Melbourne: from 2014 to around 2019, Perth was flat while Melbourne grew 50%; extending to 2021, Melbourne had grown around 100% cumulatively, while Perth (still flat through most of that window) has since caught up dramatically. His point: buying in a flat-DSR market at the wrong time can mean years of stagnation before a genuine run eventually arrives, reinforcing that personal strategy (time horizon, risk appetite) should guide the choice between a bigger, steadier city and a smaller, currently faster-moving one.
Jeremy adds that across roughly 30 years of historical data, he's identified three consistent, genuine long-term correlations to capital growth: buying a house rather than a unit, buying established rather than new (land-to-asset ratio is effectively captured within this distinction, since developers deliberately minimise land content to reduce project cost, the opposite of what benefits an investor), and avoiding proximity to vacant land due to oversupply risk. He acknowledges genuine exceptions exist (certain new estates can outperform, particularly where supply is genuinely constrained), but frames these three principles as general rules that improve the overall probability of a good outcome, not guarantees. Damien adds that assessing a new-build opportunity properly requires real diligence: checking ABS supply data, and confirming via real estate listings whether a suburb's apparent stock is genuinely available or largely unbuilt off-the-plan stock (which, in extreme cases, can push a suburb's calculated stock-on-market figure above 100%). He shares a personal anecdote of driving through the Donnybrook area north of Melbourne around 2017 and finding continuous undeveloped farmland, the kind of market he says he wouldn't invest in regardless of price.
With stock on market up and days on market lengthening, does that mean buyers now have negotiating leverage, or is it too early to push hard?
Jeremy is careful to note the data shows correlation, not proven causation, days on market and stock on market are measured outcomes, and while it's very likely factors like the Budget's tax changes and reduced affordability are contributing, there's no way to definitively isolate cause from the data alone. Damien adds that the negative gearing and capital gains changes are very likely the biggest single factor behind the current shift, and both are curious to see how the data develops heading into the traditionally quieter Christmas period.